NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

FOIA Case: 100386B
6 April 2018

SCARLET KIM
PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL
62 BRITTON STREET
LONDON EC1M 5UY
GBR

Dear Ms. Kim:

This further responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of 13 December 2016 for "access to records relating to the British-United States Communication Intelligence Agreement (now known as the "UKUSA Agreement")." There are no assessable fees for this request.

This is our second production of documents in this case. Your request has been processed under the FOIA and nine (9) responsive documents from the first category of your request are enclosed. These pages total 39 pages and are annotated as NSA FOIA Case 100386 pages 00001 – 00039. Please note that pages 00001 – 00031 are reissued versions of the documents previously released in our first production on 12 January 2018. After further coordination with our foreign partners, we are able to release more information in those documents. The one (1) document withheld in its entirety from our first production remains withheld in its entirety. This completes our processing of documents in the first category of your request.

Certain information, however, has been deleted from the enclosures.

The withheld information has been found to be currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order (E.O.) 13526. The information meets the criteria for classification as set forth in Subparagraphs (b) for foreign government information, (c) for intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology, and/or (d) for foreign relations or activities of the U.S., of Section 1.4 and remains classified up to the TOP SECRET level as provided in Section 1.2 of E.O. 13526. The information is classified because its disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security and because of potential harm to our foreign relationships. Because the information is currently and properly classified, it

is exempt from disclosure pursuant to the first exemption of the FOIA (5 U.S.C. Section 552(b)(1)).

In addition, this Agency is authorized by various statutes to protect certain information concerning its activities. We have determined that such information exists in these documents. Accordingly, those portions are exempt from disclosure pursuant to the third exemption of the FOIA, which provides for the withholding of information specifically protected from disclosure by statute. The specific statutes applicable in this case are Title 18 U.S. Code 798; Title 50 U.S. Code 3024(i); and Section 6, Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S. Code 3605).

Please be advised that we continue to work on your request and the review of additional documents responsive to your request, per subsequent agreement, continues. Documents will be provided on a rolling basis as they are completed.

Sincerely,

JOHN R. CHAPMAN
Chief, FOIA/PA Office
NSA Initial Denial Authority

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APPENDIX B

PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY AND DISSEMINATION

INTRODUCTION

1. These principles shall be the basis of all regulations for the security and dissemination of Communications Intelligence issued by or under the authority of USIB or LSIB and other appropriate authorities of the Governments of the two parties. The scope and phrasing of such regulations may vary in accordance with requirements of the parties, agencies, departments, and ministries to whom they are designed to apply, but all shall be in accord with these basic principles in every respect and shall observe the standards herein as a minimum. As an aid to uniform interpretation, each party shall forward all pertinent Board regulations and directives to the other for information.

2. Conservation of COMINT sources is of supreme importance and there is no time limit for their safeguarding. It is essential that the production, exploitation, and dissemination of COMINT, resultant intelligence, and related technical information and material be specially controlled as specified herein.

DEFINITIONS

3. Communications Intelligence

a. Communications Intelligence (COMINT) shall be construed to mean technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications and communications systems by other than the intended recipients.

b. COMINT activities shall be construed to mean those activities which produce COMINT by the interception and processing of foreign communications passed by radio, wire, or other electromagnetic means, with specific exceptions stated below, by the study of foreign communications systems and by the processing of foreign encrypted communications, however transmitted.

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Interception comprises search, intercept, and direction finding. Processing comprises range estimation, transmitter/operator identification, signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption, study of plain text, the fusion of these processes, and the reporting of results.

3. c. Foreign communications are defined as all communications except:

(1) Those of the Governments of the U.S. and the British Commonwealth.

(2) Those exchanged among private organizations and nationals, acting in a private capacity, of the U.S. and the British Commonwealth.

(3) Those of nationals of the U.S. and British Commonwealth appointed or seconded by their Governments to serve in international organizations.

d. COMINT concerning weather is meteorological information (hydrometeorological data and all information concerning meteorological organizations and activities) which is derived from foreign communications, except information and data which is used for recognized weather purposes and which is derived from those portions of broadcasts (the schedules of which have been published by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) or made internationally available by a recognized civil weather organization) which contain:

(1) unenciphered WMO codes or

(2) no code or cipher or disguised indicatives or

(3) weather codes which have been made internationally available by recognized civil weather organizations.

e. Special weather intelligence is that COMINT concerning weather which is assigned to the weather sub-category of Category II. The purpose of this sub-category is to handle separately that COMINT concerning weather which may be disseminated to users who do not require access to other codeword COMINT.

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3. f. 'Y' is tactical COMINT produced by units which are designated to provide close support for the commanders of combat forces. (See Appendix P.)

g. COMINT and COMINT activities as defined herein shall not include:

(1) Intercept and processing of unencrypted written communications, except written plain text versions of communications which have been encrypted or are intended for subsequent encryption.

(2) Intercept and processing of press, propaganda and other public broadcasts, except for encrypted or "hidden meaning" passages in such broadcasts.

(3) Certain operations conducted by U.S., U.K., or Commonwealth security authorities.

(4) Censorship.

(5) The peacetime exercise of 'Y' resources in NATO commands, which involves the interception , analysis and exploitation only of radio transmissions (albeit "foreign") on networks established or used for exercises within or between those commands, provided that:

(a) 'Y-type' information produced during the exercise or revealed in post-exercise analysis, and information about the 'Y' resources involved, is adequately safeguarded by NATO security regulations paralleling those for wartime 'Y' operations, and the U.S. and U.K. retain the right to express their views to the Command concerned as to the adequacy of the security classification applied.

(b) Techniques used in the production of exercise 'Y' during the exercise do not exceed in complexity the COMINT techniques involved in producing Category II(X) COMINT as defined in Annexure B1.

(6) The interception and study of non-communications transmissions (ELINT).

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4. Types of COMINT

There are two types of COMINT: Crypt Intelligence and Traffic Intelligence. They are defined as follows:

a. Crypt Intelligence is that COMINT which results from cryptanalysis or decryption including the solution of speech and facsimile security systems.

b. Traffic Intelligence is that COMINT produced by all means except cryptanalysis or decryption of intercepted communications.

5. Categories

For purposes of security handling and control, COMINT is divided into categories and sub-categories. (See Annexure B1)

a. COMINT is assigned to one of the following three categories as agreed between USIB and LSIB.

(1) Category III COMINT is that COMINT the unauthorized disclosure of which would risk extremely grave damage to national interests and specifically to COMINT activities and which, therefore, requires handling under special rules affording the highest degree of security protection. It is classified TOP SECRET, and is designated by a distinctive codeword.

(2) Category II COMINT is that COMINT the unauthorized disclosure of which would risk serious damage to national interests and specifically to COMINT activities, but for which a less rigid standard of security is adequate. It is classified SECRET and is designated by a distinctive codeword.

(3) Category I COMINT is that COMINT the unauthorized disclosure of which would risk little or no damage specifically to COMINT activities and for which, therefore, normal security classification procedures may be used. It will be classified at least CONFIDENTIAL and will not be designated by a codeword.

b. As mutually agreed by USIB and LSIB, separate sub-categories of COMINT may be established within Categories III and II in order to permit

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differentiation in the processing, dissemination, exchange or use of material.

6. Technical Material

Technical material is understood to mean data concerning:

a. Cryptographic systems.

b. Communication systems, procedures and methods.

c. Methods and equipment designed for COMINT activities and information related to any of the above.

7. Information related to COMINT or COMINT Activities - That information, other than COMINT itself, which reveals, directly or by implication, the existence or nature of any U.S. or U.K. COMINT activity.

8. COMINT Channels - A method or means expressly authorized for handling or transmission of COMINT and information related to COMINT activities whereby the information is provided exclusively to those persons who are appropriately cleared and indoctrinated for access to COMINT.

9. Codewords

Codewords, as used herein, are designators assigned to identify the source as COMINT; to distinguish between the COMINT categories and sub-categories; and to facilitate the application of regulations for the dissemination and use of COMINT.

10. Suitable Cover

Suitable cover is the concealment of any relationship between an action and the COMINT which motivates or influences the decision to take the action. It is achieved:

a. By ascribing the action to:

(1) existing intelligence from a non-COMINT source, or

(2) existing non-COMINT sources which could, beyond reasonable doubt, have produced the information leading to the action, or

b. By the existence of non-COMINT sources to which the action could be expected beyond reasonable doubt to be attributed.

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c. By the existence of a situation in which the action could be expected beyond reasonable doubt to be attributed to non-COMINT sources, or of a situation in which the action taken is so plausible that it would not be attributed to its COMINT source.

11. Proper Authority

The term "proper authority", as used herein, shall be the level of authority permitted to authorize usage of the several categories of COMINT during hostilities and in special and emergency situations. The determination to make these exceptions and the authority to grant these exceptions shall lie only with senior officers and officials at levels to be established by USIB or LSIB.

12. Indoctrination

Indoctrination is instruction as to the nature of COMINT and the security regulations and practices which govern the handling of COMINT material and COMINT activities.

13. Debriefing

Debriefing is the process of reminding persons no longer authorized to have access to COMINT or COMINT activities that they continue to be bound by all security regulations pertaining thereto. The debriefing shall include cautions that there is no time limit on the requirement to maintain security and that public disclosure does not free the individual from his obligation.

14. Hazardous Activities

Hazardous activities are those which place a person in a position where he runs a substantial risk of being captured or otherwise subjected to interrogation.

15. Exposed Areas

Exposed areas are those which are susceptible of being quickly overrun or those wherein the local political or military situation is such as to pose a distinct threat to the security of COMINT activities conducted therein.

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ASSIGNMENT OF COMINT TO CATEGORIES

16. In assigning COMINT to Categories (see paragraph 5), the following considerations will apply:

a. The difficulty of solution or intercept to include:

(1) Sensitivity of techniques employed in solution and exploitation.

(2) Sensitivity of source of intercept.

(3) Relationships to other COMINT.

b. The advantages to be gained versus the risk of disclosure and consequent damage through utilization under a given category taking into consideration the following factors:

(1) The potential loss of intelligence.

(2) The extent to which the target country is capable of improving the security of the communications in question.

(3) The security grading given to contents by the country originating the traffic involved.

(4) How wide the dissemination of certain COMINT should be to permit essential use of the intelligence contained therein.

(5) The capability of certain Third Party COMINT groups to exploit the COMINT in question with the attendant security risks beyond the direct control of U.S. and U.K. authorities.

(6) The value of providing technical guidance or COMINT information to Third Party COMINT activities to insure receipt from them of unique intercept and critical COMINT information not otherwise available.

17. USIB and LSIB shall have prepared and maintained in current status mutually agreed lists to indicate COMINT placed in the several categories and in such sub-categories as may be established.

CLASSIFICATION AND CODEWORDS

18. Separate and distinctive codewords shall be employed to designate Category III and Category II COMINT and each sub-category thereof.



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Category I COMINT shall not be designated by a codeword. Codewords shall be replaced when in the opinion of either USIB or LSIB a requirement exists for a change.

19. Documents and Technical material which reveal actual or prognosticated success, progress, scale and direction of effort, or other sensitive details about the production of COMINT shall bear the classification or the classification and codeword appropriate to the highest category or sub-category of COMINT to which they relate and shall be handled accordingly, even though such documents and technical material may not contain COMINT as such.

20. Raw traffic (i.e., intercepted traffic showing no evidence of processing for COMINT purposes beyond sorting by clear address elements, elimination of unwanted messages and the inclusion of a case number and/or an arbitrary traffic designator) shall be classified not lower than CONFIDENTIAL, and is understood not to be any specific category of COMINT and need not be designated by a codeword.

21. Codewords. The fact that codewords are used to designate COMINT categories shall not be made known to non-indoctrinated persons nor shall these codewords be used in the presence of non-indoctrinated persons.

SECURITY

22. All persons, including intercept operators, to be assigned to duties involving categories of COMINT other than Category I shall be indoctrinated. Recipients of Category I COMINT only will not be indoctrinated. Producers of Category I COMINT only need not be indoctrinated.

23. Every effort shall be made to restrict the number of persons indoctrinated for COMINT to the essential minimum.

24. It shall be permissible for persons who have access only to a lower category or sub-category of COMINT to work within Agencies or Centers in which there are located other persons engaged in the production or exploitation of a higher category or sub-category of COMINT, only so

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long as due precaution shall be taken (by providing segregated, secure areas or otherwise) to ensure that the activities and knowledge of such persons are confined to the COMINT material and activities to which they are authorized to have access.

25. Except as determined by USIB or LSIB, all persons to be assigned to duties involving COMINT shall be the subject of security investigation and clearance. As an aid to promoting uniform minimum standards of eligibility, each party shall inform the other of the standards prescribed by it for this purpose.

26. Under extraordinary conditions, as determined by USIB or LSIB, it may be essential for an individual to take up duties involving COMINT before the requisite investigation can be completed. In such cases, the person concerned may be suitably indoctrinated on the authority only of senior officers or officials as designated by the respective parties. In all such cases, steps shall be taken to ensure that security investigations and clearances are completed as soon as possible after indoctrination.

27. All persons who have been indoctrinated for COMINT shall be debriefed when they no longer have the requisite need-to-know.

28. Each party shall ensure that complete lists of indoctrinated persons are maintained.

29. USIB and LSIB shall keep each other fully informed of the approximate number of indoctrinated persons in each of the departments, ministries, agencies, and offices receiving COMINT, by category or sub-category where applicable.

30. No national of one party shall be permitted access to the COMINT organizations or to the Categories III and II COMINT of the other party, unless he has been approved by his parent organization or Board and has been properly indoctrinated. Such access shall be limited to the categories or sub-categories of COMINT agreed by his parent organization or Board.

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Annex B

31. Every effort shall be made to ensure that no person who has a knowledge of current value about COMINT, except recipients of Category I only, such that his capture or interrogation could be a substantial risk to the security of COMINT, shall be assigned to or engage in hazardous activities. All possible action shall be taken to discourage or prevent any individual with a knowledge of current value about COMINT, except recipients of Category I only, from engaging in hazardous activities in any unofficial capacity at any time. Security principles governing participation in hazardous activities are set forth in Annexure B2.

32. Collection, processing, and dissemination of COMINT in exposed areas shall be undertaken only after a careful evaluation of the advantages to be gained and the risk to the security of COMINT. Security principles governing the conduct of COMINT activities in exposed areas are set forth in Annexure B2.

33. Except as implicitly involved in the operation of paragraphs 34-37, and 39 below, codeword material shall remain exclusively in the custody of indoctrinated persons, secure from examination by non-indoctrinated persons.

DISSEMINATION AND USE OF COMINT

34. General

a. The basic principle governing the dissemination of COMINT is the "need-to-know". Each item of COMINT shall, therefore, be made known only to those individuals who require it in the performance of their duties.

b. Except as specifically provided in paragraphs 34d and 35-37 below each item of COMINT shall be made known only to persons who are indoctrinated and authorized to have access to the particular category or sub-category of COMINT to which such item appertains. Such persons may include nationals of collaborating British Commonwealth countries (Canada, Australia and New Zealand).

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34. c. Except as provided hereafter, no action which could compromise the COMINT source may be taken on the basis of Category III or Category II (including sub-categories thereof) COMINT.

d. In accordance with the normal practices as regards intelligence information of similar classification, Category I COMINT may be disseminated to non-indoctrinated persons, including foreign nationals, and action may be taken thereon. However, whenever feasible, it is desirable to keep Category I COMINT in COMINT channels and to devise suitable cover before action is taken. When removed from such channels, this material should not contain references to, or otherwise disclose the existence of higher categories of COMINT.

e. The need may arise, in individual cases of special sensitivity, or more generally, for either party to handle COMINT items, or information related to COMINT or COMINT activities, in a more restricted manner than required by the provisions of this Appendix and its Annexures. In such cases the other party will, on request, provide similar handling for the specific items concerned.

35. Special Usage

a. As specified by either Board, suitably indoctrinated persons may use Category II or Category III COMINT in the preparation of intelligence appreciations, studies and estimates, and such additional documents as may be specified by either Board, issued at TOP SECRET classification (Category II COMINT at SECRET classification) but without COMINT codewords, provided that the statements contained in them are so generalized that they cannot be traced to their COMINT origin. These documents may be released to or discussed with Third Party nationals according to normal national security regulations. Specific COMINT detail must be restricted to supporting papers carrying the appropriate COMINT codeword and circulated and handled accordingly (i.e. not released to or discussed with Third Party nationals).

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35. b. As specified by either Board, information derived from Category II or Category III COMINT, for which there is suitable cover, may be entered without the COMINT codeword in the following types of classified documents: departmental and theater plans, maps, and target folders, but only in such form as does not indicate or reveal the COMINT origin.

c. Upon determination by proper authority that suitable cover exists and that the advantage to be gained clearly outweighs the possible risk of loss of the COMINT source and consequently of valuable intelligence, action may be taken on the basis of Category II or Category III COMINT. In determining the "proper authority" for this paragraph (see paragraph 11) particular attention will be paid to the need for the authority to be such that the consequences of the possible loss of the COMINT source will be taken

[redacted]

d. As specified by either Board, technical instructions based upon Category II or Category III COMINT may be issued to non-indoctrinated intercept operators (including D/F, RFP operators, and the like) without use of the appropriate codeword, if in such form and of such nature as to give no indication of the specific COMINT origin, and provided they are essential to the tasks of those concerned.

e. Category II or Category III COMINT material, exclusive of end product, may be handled by indoctrinated persons within COMINT collection or processing agencies without the use of the appropriate codeword.

f. As specified by either Board, weather forecasts or conclusions based in whole or in part on analysis of maps, etc., on which Special Weather Intelligence material has been plotted, may be issued to non-indoctrinated persons who require such information in the performance of their duties,

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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provided the form of issue gives no indication whatever of the COMINT origin.

35. g. Certain less sensitive Category II COMINT designated by USIB and LSIB may be assigned to a sub-category to permit more effective utilization (see paragraph 5b of Annexure B1). Upon determination by proper authority that it is in the national interest, or necessary for the protection of armed forces, action, without cover, may be taken on this material and it may be included in non-codeword documents, and it may be disseminated without codeword to non-indoctrinated persons, including foreign nationals, provided: (1) that the material is classified at least SECRET; (2) that direct evidence of the specific COMINT source -- communication data such as frequencies, callsigns, network identifications, etc., -- is omitted except in cases where that data is prerequisite to its use by the non-indoctrinated persons involved and (3) that as much other detail is omitted as is consistent with effective use. Whenever action is taken or dissemination made under the provisions of this paragraph, NSA and GCHQ, through technical channels, will undertake to keep the other party informed, at least in general terms, of the material involved.

h. When required for 'Y' planning purposes the U.S. and U.K. national 'Y' authorities may furnish technical material to the level of the sub-category mentioned in paragraph g above to SACEUR and SACLANT for provision on a need-to-know basis to Third Party nationals in SACEUR and SACLANT commands. Such material will not carry a COMINT codeword.

i. Sub-paragraph 34d above applies with respect to special usage of Category I COMINT.

36. Emergency Usage.

a. In an extreme emergency Category III COMINT may be disseminated to non-indoctrinated persons, including foreign nationals, and action without cover may be taken, based solely on that COMINT, provided that proper authority has determined that such utilization is necessary to counter an imminent threat to vital national interests.

b. In an emergency Category II COMINT, including Special Weather Intelligence, may be disseminated to non-indoctrinated persons, including foreign nationals, and action without cover may be taken based solely on that

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COMINT, provided that proper authority has determined that such utilization is necessary to the national security or, in the case of a military commander, to the security of forces under his command.

36. c. The decision to execute the provisions of paragraphs a and b above shall be made only after a determination that the advantages to be gained clearly justify the risk of compromise of the source. Due regard shall also be given to:

(1) The relative value of the particular COMINT source involved and the possibility that its compromise may lead to the loss of other COMINT sources.

(2) The possible repercussions on current and future operations and also on other commands and areas.

d. In order to minimize the risk of compromise the following precautions shall be observed:

(1) A studied effort shall be made to insure, insofar as possible, that the action taken cannot be attributed to information obtained from a COMINT source. Suitable cover, if not available, shall be arranged (e.g. air reconnaissance) if time permits.

(2) A minimum number of non-indoctrinated personnel shall be given the information, and

(a) when practicable the information shall be so presented that it cannot be traced to COMINT as a source, or

(b) if it is necessary to cite COMINT as the source in order to validate the information, the specific COMINT source shall be revealed only when absolutely necessary.

(3) The minimum amount of information necessary to justify the contemplated action shall be revealed.

e. If communications by electrical means are involved they must be enciphered in the most secure cryptographic system available.

f. If time permits the commander or official making this decision should consult with his supporting COMINT authority for technical advice.

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36. g. Whenever any of the provisions of sub-paragraphs 36a or 36b, above, are executed, USIB and LSIB will keep each other informed. This information shall contain a description of the COMINT material involved, and, in general terms, the extent and nature of the action taken. If Third Parties are involved USIB and LSIB will consult beforehand if time allows.

h. Sub-paragraph 35g above, applies with respect to emergency usage of the material in the sub-category of Category II described therein.

i. Sub-paragraph 34d, above, applies with respect to emergency usage of Category I COMINT.

37. Hostilities

a. It is recognized that in the event of hostilities certain material will be downgraded. In connection with the mutually agreed lists referred to in paragraph 17, USIB and LSIB will agree upon types of materials suitable for downgrading during hostilities. When hostilities appear imminent or occur the two Boards will immediately consult upon downgrading measures to be taken.

b. Category III COMINT designated by USIB and LSIB as "conditionally releasable COMINT" may be disseminated to non-indoctrinated persons in NATO commands, including foreign nationals. The conditions specified in Appendix P must be observed.

c. Category II COMINT may be disseminated to 'Y'-indoctrinated persons in NATO commands in accordance with special security regulations in Appendix P provided it is not expressly excluded by USIB and LSIB.

d. In an extreme emergency Category III COMINT may be disseminated to non-indoctrinated persons, including foreign nationals, and action without cover may be taken, based solely on that COMINT, provided that proper authority has determined that such utilization is vital to the successful prosecution of the war. Prior to invoking this provision, due consideration shall be given to the conditions described in sub-paragraphs 36c-36f.

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37. e. In an emergency Category II COMINT may be disseminated to non-indoctrinated persons, including foreign nationals, and action without cover may be taken, based solely on that COMINT, provided the proper authority has determined that such utilization is necessary to the national security or, in the case of a military commander, to the security of forces under his command. Prior to invoking this provision, due consideration shall be given to the conditions described in sub-paragraphs 36c-36f.

f. Whenever any of the provisions of sub-paragraphs 37d and 37e, above, are executed, USIB and LSIB will keep each other informed. This information shall contain a description of the COMINT material involved, and, in general terms, the extent and nature of the action taken.

g. In the event of hostilities the proper authority may direct the appropriate COMINT organization responsible for providing his support to downgrade to Category I that material in the sub-category of Category II described in paragraph 35g which is relevant to the situation. Such information may then be disseminated or action be taken thereon in accordance with the procedures established for Category I COMINT. The cognizant COMINT organization will immediately, without prior consultation with higher authority, make available as Category I such material of this sub-category as is required. USIB and LSIB will keep each other informed of downgrading actions taken.

h. Sub-paragraph 34d, above, applies with respect to wartime usage of Category I COMINT. Whenever suitable 'Y' channels are available, they will be used for this dissemination.

PROCEDURES

38. The appropriate classification and codeword shall:

a. Appear on every sheet of paper which contains or discloses Category III or II COMINT or a sub-category thereof, and be applied to documents and technical material as defined in paragraph 19. Except as provided in paragraphs 35-37, above, this rule applies to maps and charts on which are plotted data and information derived from these categories of COMINT.

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38. b. Be encrypted in the text of every encrypted communication conveying Category III or II COMINT and appear in plain language at the head of the decrypted version. This rule shall apply in all instances except as provided in paragraphs 35-37, above, and under the following conditions:

(1) COMINT organizations may, without encrypting the appropriate codeword in the encrypted text, transmit TOP SECRET and SECRET technical matter over cryptographic channels or ciphers expressly and exclusively provided for such technical matters.

(2) COMINT organizations and intercept or D/F stations may, at the discretion of the officer in charge and after full consideration of the risks involved to the source, omit the classification and the appropriate codeword from its work-sheets and similar documents used exclusively within each agency or station. The classification may be omitted from raw traffic passed between agencies or from intercept and D/F stations to agencies.

39. Category III COMINT and related technical material shall not be transmitted in plain language except as follows:

a. Sealed, by safehand channels, over routes specifically approved by USIB or LSIB.

b. Over completely protected local communication systems exclusively internal to agencies or offices producing or utilizing COMINT.

c. Over landlines specifically approved in each instance by USIB or LSIB.

40. Category II COMINT and related technical material shall not be transmitted in plain language except as provided in paragraph 39 above, or by protected postal channels internal to, or under exclusive control of, the U. S., the U. K. or other collaborating British Commonwealth countries.

41. Category I COMINT and related technical material should be transmitted by COMINT or 'Y' channels wherever possible, but may be transmitted by conventional channels used for intelligence materials of similar classification.

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It may be transmitted in plain language by a means exposed to interception only when there is no suitable means of secure communications available and when there is an urgent operational need to do so. Whenever possible such plain language transmissions should be in the form of operational orders so worded that the subject matter cannot be traced specifically to COMINT as its origin.

42. Raw traffic may be transmitted in plain language as provided in paragraph 39, above. Raw traffic classified CONFIDENTIAL may also be transmitted in accordance with the normal procedure for this classification, except that when transported across the territory of the country originating the traffic, it shall be with the express sanction of USIB or LSIB. This sanction will be granted only in cases of compelling need.

43. Except as provided in paragraphs 35-37, above:

a. Category III COMINT and related technical material transmitted in encrypted form shall be encrypted in special cryptographic channels expressly provided for these subjects.

b. Category II COMINT and related technical material transmitted in encrypted form shall be encrypted in special cryptographic channels expressly provided for these subjects, those listed in paragraph a., above, or in the most secure cryptographic channel available.

c. However, in the case of cryptographic systems mutually approved for the purpose, the transmission of COMINT, related technical material and raw traffic over the same channel is authorized, provided that such channels are reserved for these subjects exclusively.

44. In order to facilitate a concerted effort directed toward the determination and assessment of the causes and effects of known or presumed COMINT compromises or losses, it is agreed that:

a. Whenever any breach of its COMINT security regulations or any other circumstance which in fact has, or can be presumed to have, compromised COMINT or COMINT codewords, or to have revealed COMINT successes to unauthorized

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persons, becomes known to either party, it shall inform the other by means of a report embodying the pertinent facts and conclusions in each case, except that when the party concerned concludes that there is a good reason to believe that such compromise or revelation has not reached and will not, in fact, reach foreign nationals, no report need be made to the other party.

b. Whenever a significant change occurs in foreign cryptographic or communications security, the party discovering such change shall notify the other. Each party shall then analyze and assess the known and suspected circumstances having a bearing upon the change; these analyses and assessments shall be exchanged by the parties; and each party shall thereafter keep the other fully informed of any additional information bearing upon the case.

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APPENDIX B

ANNEXURE B1

THE ASSIGNMENT OF COMINT

TO CATEGORIES AND SUB-CATEGORIES

1. This Annexure delineates the basis for (a) the establishment of sub-categories, (b) the assignment of COMINT to categories and sub-categories, (c) the classification of COMINT assigned to categories and sub-categories, and (d) the application of codewords to categories and sub-categories. This Annexure is not intended to accomplish the detailed categorization of all COMINT. However, along with the criteria described in Appendix B, it governs the preparation and maintenance of current, mutually agreed lists to indicate the precise assignment of all COMINT to categories and sub-categories.

2. Category I COMINT shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET as appropriate in accordance with national security classification procedures and shall not be designated by a codeword. It shall contain the following, provided that interpretations of material of higher categories are not included:

a. Direction finding results, regardless of the category of technical guidance involved. This material shall normally be classified as CONFIDENTIAL.

b. COMINT concerning weather derived from Category I sources.

c. Such COMINT from the less sensitive sub-category of Category II as may be so assigned in accordance with Appendix B. (See paragraph 35g)

d. Such additional COMINT as has been or may be specified and mutually agreed by USIB and LSIB.

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3. Category II COMINT shall be classified SECRET and shall be designated by a distinctive codeword. It shall contain all COMINT not otherwise assigned to Categories I and III, or sub-categories within Category II.

4. Category III COMINT shall be classified TOP SECRET, and shall be designated by a distinctive codeword. It shall contain:

a. Crypt Intelligence derived from high-grade systems, involving the application of sophisticated cryptanalytic techniques, as specified and mutually agreed by USIB and LSIB.

b. Traffic Intelligence derived from callsigns or message headings encrypted in codes and ciphers of high security or complexity, as specified and mutually agreed by USIB and LSIB.

c. Traffic or Crypt Intelligence which reveals success against unusual, sensitive, or complex transmission procedures or devices.

d. Material obtained from special sources or against targets considered by the procuring organization to be so sensitive as to warrant the protection afforded this category.

e. Crypt Intelligence from diplomatic and attaché communications.

f. Other Crypt or Traffic Intelligence which USIB and LSIB agree should be given the highest degree of security protection because of the potential loss of intelligence which would result from compromise.

5. Sub-categories of Category II shall be established as follows:

a. Sub-Category II(W) COMINT shall contain all COMINT concerning weather, which is not specifically assigned to other categories by USIB and LSIB. It is classified SECRET, designated by a distinctive codeword, and referred to as "Special Weather Intelligence". The purpose of this sub-category is to handle separately that COMINT concerning weather which may be disseminated to users who do not require access to other codeword COMINT.

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b. Sub-Category II(X) COMINT is that Category II COMINT which is considered less sensitive than other Category II COMINT and may, therefore, be given more extensive dissemination in order to provide for effective utilization. It is classified SECRET and is designated by a distinctive codeword. It is this sub-category which is described in paragraph 35g of Appendix B. Provided that no information obtained from Categories II and III COMINT, such as complex changing callsign and frequency systems or unusual, sensitive or complex transmission procedures or devices, is included, this sub-category shall contain the following:

(1) Information derived from the following elements of foreign military, naval, air, police, border guard and guerilla communications or communications systems:

(a) Communications data

(b) Plain Text

(c) Any grid or zone references

(d) Cover Words

(e) Procedural codes used for brevity purposes

(f) Jargon codes

(2) Plain Text and associated communications data obtained from international commercial and foreign internal or external non-military circuits except that specifically assigned to other categories as mutually agreed by USIB and LSIB.

(3) Such additional COMINT as may be specified and mutually agreed by USIB and LSIB.

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APPENDIX B

ANNEXURE B2

SECURITY PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT

OF COMINT OPERATIONS IN EXPOSED AREAS

INTRODUCTION

1. It is recognized that effective interception of foreign communications and effective support of field commanders may require the establishment of COMINT activities in locations which may suddenly fall under hostile control with consequent loss of COMINT personnel and/or associated classified materials. It is agreed that, in addition to the pertinent, general provisions of Appendix B, the specific provisions which follow shall govern the conduct of COMINT activities in such locations.

DEFINITIONS

2. Exposed areas as defined in paragraph 15, Appendix B comprise the Sino-Soviet Bloc, other countries under bloc domination, areas beyond defense lines expected to be tenable, and areas wherein the local political or military situation is such as to pose a distinct threat to the security of COMINT operations conducted therein. The degree of risk is dependent upon the capability of support and security forces to protect the COMINT unit through sufficient delaying action to allow time for the destruction of classified material and prompt evacuation of COMINT personnel. The following situations may exist in exposed areas:

a. Risky situations, i.e., those in which it is considered possible that timely and complete evacuation of COMINT personnel and removal or effective destruction of classified material will be accomplished before a unit can be overrun.

b. Dangerous situations, i.e., those in which it is unlikely that timely and complete evacuation of COMINT personnel and removal or

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effective destruction of classified material will be accomplished before a unit can be overrun.

3. Hazardous activities as defined in paragraph 14, Appendix B include:

a. Duties behind enemy lines, or in-shore operations off an enemy or unfriendly country.

b. Flights over enemy or unfriendly territory unless on recognized corridor routes.

c. Raids, minor formation attacks, underwater demolition operations, and service with a unit or formation forward of Division HQ.

d. Duty in or visits to unfriendly countries and also other areas where from time to time local conditions are considered to involve an unacceptable risk.

e. Transit through the Soviet Zone of Germany unless in authorized military or diplomatic transport on regular routes.

4. For the purposes of paragraph 3, unfriendly countries are understood to be the Sino-Soviet Bloc and other countries where similar risks to U. S. or U. K. nationals are likely. Lists of the latter countries will be exchanged between USIB and LSIB.

SAFEGUARDS FOR ASSIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL TO HAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES

5. As an aid to controlling assignment of personnel to hazardous activities, persons who are or have been indoctrinated will be divided into three groups:

a. Group U - (Unrestricted)

Individuals who are producers of Category I COMINT and have no knowledge of other Categories, or persons who, although indoctrinated for other Categories of COMINT, have so little access that they do not possess knowledge of current value, and are not subject to restrictions against hazardous activities.

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b. Group M - (Minimum Restriction - one year)

Individuals who have knowledge of current value about Categories II or III COMINT or their subcategories, who shall not be assigned to hazardous activities for a minimum period of one year following debriefing.

c. Group P - (Permanent Restriction)

Individuals with precise knowledge of COMINT processing techniques, competence or potential regarding the more sensitive Category III COMINT who shall not be assigned to hazardous activities at any time.

6. Exceptions to the above safeguards may be authorized by senior officers and officials at a level prescribed by USIB or LSIB. In considering such exceptions the protection offered by diplomatic status should not automatically be considered sufficient, but should be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances involved. In the case of Allied Commands to which UKUSA COMINT is provided through an SSO or CCU, the senior COMINT indoctrinated U. S. and U. K. officers shall be authorized to make such exceptions.

EVALUATION OF SITUATIONS IN EXPOSED AREAS

7. The decision whether a given situation is risky or dangerous shall be made by USIB or LSIB or by such other authorities as are responsible for the security of the COMINT activities concerned, and shall be made in the light of the political, military, and other factors affecting the safety of the COMINT personnel and materials involved.

FACTORS AFFECTING DECISIONS TO CONDUCT COMINT OPERATIONS IN EXPOSED AREAS

8. COMINT operations shall be conducted in exposed areas only after due consideration of the COMINT losses which may result if the area concerned is suddenly attacked, and of the probable effect of such losses upon the conduct of COMINT activities elsewhere.

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SAFEGUARDS FOR RISKY SITUATIONS

9. In the case of COMINT activities established in risky situations, the following safeguards shall be applied save as exceptions thereto are authorized by senior officers and officials at a level established by USIB or LSIB:

a. Only intercept, analytic and reporting tasks which cannot be performed satisfactorily in safe or protected situations shall be assigned.

b. No Category III COMINT or related documents and technical material shall be held except those essential to the assigned task and of current application thereto, and the latter shall be maintained in such condition as to insure immediate destruction, if necessary, upon sudden threat of seizure.

c. No person in Group P, as defined in paragraph 5c above, shall be assigned, unless required by technical considerations.

d. Sufficient means of destruction shall be provided in order that complete destruction of classified COMINT materials may be carried out in the shortest time possible by the minimum number of personnel.

e. Appropriate steps shall be taken to insure that adequate arrangements are made for safe evacuation of all personnel whose loss would be damaging and that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis.

SAFEGUARDS FOR DANGEROUS SITUATIONS

10. In the case of COMINT units established in dangerous situations the following safeguards shall be applied save as exceptions thereto are authorized by senior officers and officials of a level established by USIB or LSIB:

a. Only unique intercept tasks which cannot be accomplished elsewhere shall be assigned, and only such analysis as is locally required to support these tasks and permit essential technical reporting shall be performed.

b. Only COMINT documents or technical aids essential and of current application to these tasks shall be held.

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c. No Category III COMINT or related documents and technical material shall be held.

d. Personnel technically informed in COMINT of a higher level or broader scope than is required for the limited mission of the unit should not be assigned if avoidable.

e. No person in Group M as defined in sub-paragraph 5b above shall be assigned unless his presence is vital for the effective functioning of the unit.

f. No person in Group P as defined in sub-paragraph 5c above shall be assigned in any circumstances.

g. Sufficient means of destruction shall be provided in order that maximum destruction of classified COMINT material may be carried on in the shortest time possible by the minimum number of personnel.

h. Appropriate steps shall be taken to insure that the unit in question is kept informed of evacuation plans on a current basis.

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APPENDIX J

PRINCIPLES OF UKUSA COLLABORATION WITH COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE UK

Introduction

1. This Appendix records the general principles governing UKUSA COMINT collaboration with Commonwealth countries (other than the UK).

General

2. Commonwealth countries other than the UK are not parties to the UKUSA COMINT Agreement but they will not be regarded as Third Parties. Canada, Australia and New Zealand with whom there are special agreements on COMINT policy are referred to as collaborating countries.

3. LSIB will keep USIB informed of any arrangements or proposed arrangements with Commonwealth countries and will obtain the views of USIB prior to initiating or pursuing with any non-collaborating country COMINT arrangements involving the release of material or the provision of guidance in accordance with paragraph 9 of Appendix P. Prior to the release to a non-collaborating country of data as described in sub-paragraph 8(e) of Appendix P, GCHQ will obtain the view of NSA regarding the suitability of the data for release.

4. Arrangements for collaboration between the U.S. and the joint Australian/UK/New Zealand agency, Defence Signals Branch Melbourne, and for U.S. liaison in Australia and New Zealand are set out in Annexure J1. Any major changes in or additions to these arrangements for U.S. collaboration with Australia and New Zealand will be the subject of prior consultation between USIB and LSIB.

5. USIB will obtain the views of LSIB prior to completing an arrangement with Canada.

6. USIB will conduct its arrangements with all other Commonwealth countries in accordance with the principles set out in Appendix P to the UKUSA COMINT Agreement.

7. It is noted that LSIB has obtained from the COMINT authorities of collaborating Commonwealth countries formal assurances that they will abide by the terms of paragraphs 5, 8, and 9 of the UKUSA COMINT Agreement, and of Appendix B and paragraph 7 of Appendix E thereto.

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8. USIB and LSIB agree:

(a) not to pass to any Commonwealth country COMINT end-product items originated by agencies of the other party without the consent of that party, except as may be agreed from time to time;

(b) to pass to collaborating Commonwealth countries, via agreed COMINT channels, only such technical COMINT materials as are deemed to be relevant to the tasks of the Commonwealth country concerned or as may be otherwise agreed between the two parties from time to time; the relevance of technical COMINT materials to the tasks of those Commonwealth countries shall be determined by the Director, GCHQ or the Director, NSA; relevant materials shall then be releasable subject to whatever restrictions may be specified by the agency which produced the material (i.e. GCHQ or NSA).

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APPENDIX J

ANNEXURE J1

UKUSA ARRANGEMENTS AFFECTING AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

1. It is noted that Defence Signals Branch Melbourne (DSB) is, in contrast to Communications Branch Ottawa, not a purely national centre. It is and will continue to be a joint UK-Australian-New Zealand organization, manned by an integrated staff. It is a civilian organization under the Australian Department of Defence and undertakes COMINT tasks as agreed between the COMINT governing authorities of Australia and New Zealand on the one hand and LSIB on the other. On technical matters only, control is exercised by Government Communications Headquarters on behalf of LSIB.

2. GCHQ will keep NSA informed of the tasks that have been agreed for DSB and will notify NSA in advance before any new or altered task is agreed for DSB.

3. NSA and DSB will collaborate directly on those DSB tasks which, as determined by NSA, fall within the field of collaboration and will exchange raw material, technical material and end-product of these tasks. In addition NSA will provide DSB with raw material, technical material and end-product as appropriate on other tasks determined by NSA to be relevant to the tasks of DSB. A list of tasks under both these heads will be maintained currently by NSA and GCHQ.

4. NSA and DSB will also exchange technical interception data relating to the General Search effort of each in the Far East.

5. Exchanges between NSA and DSB under the above paragraphs will be complete in scope but in special circumstances each agency will have the right to withhold material at its discretion.

6. The direct collaboration and consequent exchanges between NSA and DSB will be regulated by the provisions of the following appendices to the UKUSA Agreement: C, D, E, F, G, H, I, L, M.

7. It is noted that, in interpretation of Appendix I to the UKUSA Agreement, DSB and NSA have mutually accredited liaison officers.

8. It is further noted that, in interpretation of Appendix I to the

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UKUSA Agreement, USIB may accredit a senior U.S. representative for conducting liaison on matters pertaining to COMINT with Australia and New Zealand and, as may be agreed by LSIB, with UK officials in those countries. Similarly, the terms of reference for the DSB liaison officer accredited to NSA may be modified at some future date to permit the conduct of liaison with U.S. authorities on matters pertaining to COMINT.

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APPENDIX B

ANNEXURE B3

CLASSIFICATION AND HANDLING OF INFORMATION

RELATED TO COMINT OR COMINT ACTIVITIES

INTRODUCTION

1. This Annexure establishes minimum standards with respect to the handling and classification of information which is neither COMINT nor that contained in the "documents and technical material" as described in paragraph 19 of Appendix B, yet reveals, directly or by implication, the existence or nature of COMINT or of COMINT activities.

2. The nature of COMINT and COMINT activities and their susceptibility to loss require that certain information regarding these activities and their product be restricted to persons who have been cleared and indoctrinated for access to COMINT. Certain other information concerning these activities and their product may be handled within conventional channels for information of similar classification. It is essential, however, that reference to the existence or nature of COMINT or any COMINT activity, either direct or indirect, be avoided except among those to whom the knowledge is necessary for the proper performance of their duties.

3. Information related to COMINT or COMINT activities which indicates a degree of success or progress in the production of COMINT, a sophisticated COMINT technique or the scale and direction of COMINT effort to a degree which may stimulate countermeasures, as specified in Annex A hereto, must be safeguarded precisely as though it were COMINT. Except as provided for hereinafter, documents containing such information, including messages transmitted electrically, shall be transmitted only via COMINT channels, and shall bear the classification and COMINT codeword appropriate to the most sensitive category or sub-category of COMINT to which they relate.

4. Information related to COMINT or COMINT activities, specified in Annex B hereto, shall be kept exclusively within COMINT channels, except as provided for hereinafter and in that Annex. Documents which contain such information,

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including messages transmitted electrically, shall bear the appropriate classification but no COMINT codeword, and shall be clearly identified by the caveat "HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY", stamped, typewritten, or printed on each page. In the case of bound documents, the identification will show on the cover and title page, if any.

5. Information pertaining to COMINT or COMINT activities, specified in Annex C hereto, may be handled in accordance with normal practice for other information of similar classification. However, nothing herein should be construed as prohibiting an authority from passing such information in COMINT channels. (In such cases, the caveat "HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY" will not be used.)

SPECIAL USAGE

6. Should it become necessary to furnish information of the types listed in Annex A to non-indoctrinated persons, such action will be taken only after specific authorization in each case by proper authority designated by USIB or LSIB. When a document containing such information is released from COMINT channels, the codeword must be removed. NSA and GCHQ, through technical channels, will undertake to keep the other party informed, at least in general terms, of the material involved.

7. Information related to COMINT or COMINT activities of the types listed in Annex B may be furnished to non-indoctrinated persons, only with the prior approval of the originator or proper authority and in accordance with the procedures established by USIB or LSIB. When a document containing such information is released from COMINT channels, the handling caveat must be removed or rendered illegible.

8. Every reasonable precaution must be taken to ensure that documents released from COMINT channels are given minimum distribution and receive the security protection their contents warrant.

9. Working papers and similar documents containing information of the types listed in Annexes A and B need not, at the discretion of the officer in charge and after full consideration of the risks involved, bear the classification, codeword or handling caveat when handled exclusively within a COMINT secure area by indoctrinated persons.

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CLASSIFICATION

10. The classification of each document containing information related to COMINT or COMINT activities must be determined individually, after due consideration of the damage which unauthorized disclosure of its contents could cause to national security, national interests, and the capability of either party to continue to produce communications intelligence.

PUBLIC STATEMENTS

11. Maximum feasible administrative action will be taken to require that all public statements which may contain information related to COMINT or COMINT activities are submitted, for preliminary review and advice, to the appropriate COMINT authority, as specified by either Board. In the event that such information already publicly revealed is included in a document submitted by a private source for review, an attempt by persuasion shall be made to eliminate such information or to express it in such general terms as to conceal, to the maximum degree possible, specific associations with COMINT activities. In the event such a document is submitted by an official source, that document will be classified in accordance with paragraph 10 above.

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APPENDIX B

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ANNEX A

TYPES OF INFORMATION TO BE GIVEN THE SAME PROTECTION AS COMINT

1. When information which is neither COMINT nor that contained in the "documents and technical material" referred to in paragraph 19 of Appendix B, indicates:-

(a) a degree of success or progress being made in the production of communications intelligence, or

(b) a sophisticated COMINT technique, or

(c) the scale and direction of the COMINT effort to a degree which may stimulate countermeasures,

it must be accorded the protection of the classification and COMINT codeword appropriate to the highest category of COMINT to which it relates, and will be kept within COMINT channels unless released therefrom by proper authority designated by USIB or LSIB. If the category of COMINT to which the information relates is not known, it will be accorded the protection of the highest category.

2. Examples of the kind of information which may reveal (a), (b) or (c) above are:-

(a) Consumer requirements for information from a specific source.

(b) Information regarding the nature and extent of COMINT collaboration with foreign governments.

(c) Detailed characteristics and capabilities of equipment as applied in the exploitation of COMINT.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(d) Details of COMINT-developed techniques used in COMINT research or production.

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ANNEXURE B3

ANNEX B

TYPES OF INFORMATION TO BE HANDLED VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

1. Information which does not require codeword protection but which relates to COMINT or COMINT activities will bear the classification indicated (but no codeword), will carry the caveat "HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY" and be retained in COMINT channels unless exempted or released in accordance with procedures established by USIB or LSIB.

TOP SECRET

2. Information relating to COMINT or COMINT activities will be classified TOP SECRET if the unauthorized disclosure of it could result in exceptionally grave damage to national security, national interests or the continued conduct of COMINT operations. Examples of the kind of information which may warrant this classification are:-

(a) A plan, doctrine or policy or information on tasking or control which reveals specific COMINT operations of major importance.

(b) Information revealing the extent or nature of COMINT collaboration with specific foreign governments, including written agreements establishing such collaboration.

(c) Details of COMINT arrangements with Third Parties.

(d) Construction and budgetary information of major importance relating to COMINT collection and processing organizations and installations.

(e) Safe combinations permitting access to COMINT or information regarding COMINT activities.

SECRET

3. Information relating to COMINT or COMINT activities will be classified SECRET if the unauthorized disclosure of it could result in serious damage to national security, national interests or the continued conduct of COMINT operations. Examples of the kind of information which may warrant this classification are:-

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(a) A plan, doctrine, or policy or information on tasking or control which reveals important specific COMINT operations.

(b) Base rights negotiations for COMINT sites, which involve disclosure of the specific purposes for which the sites are intended.

(c) Important construction and budgetary information relating to COMINT collection and processing organizations and installations.

(d) Individual intercept assignments.

(e) Detailed D/F plans and overall operational effectiveness of D/F organizations.

(f) All personnel reports and documents, civilian and/or military which indicate authorized and/or actual agency COMINT strength in total, by job designation or by organizational element title where such designation or organizational element title would indicate details of the COMINT mission.

(g) Information which reveals the existence, but not the extent or nature, of collaboration or liaison on COMINT matters with specific foreign governments unless a higher classification is warranted by special circumstances.

(h) References to the existence of Third Party COMINT arrangements, without specific details unless a higher classification is warranted by special circumstances.

CONFIDENTIAL

4. Information relating to COMINT or COMINT activities will be classified CONFIDENTIAL if the unauthorized disclosure of it could be prejudicial to national security, national interests or the continued conduct of COMINT operations. Examples of the kind of information which may warrant this classification are:-

(a) A plan, doctrine, or policy or information on tasking or control which reveals specific COMINT operations of a minor nature.

(b) COMINT indoctrination and debriefing statements.

(c) Lists of COMINT indoctrinated and debriefed personnel.

(d) Information which reveals extent of effort or special purpose features of electronic computers as utilized for COMINT processing, without revealing COMINT techniques.

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APPENDIX B

ANNEXURE B3

ANNEX C

TYPES OF INFORMATION WHICH MAY BE HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL SECURITY REGULATIONS

1. Information pertaining to COMINT which neither requires codeword protection nor the caveat "HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY" will be classified and handled in accordance with U.S. or U.K. governmental security regulations in effect for information unconnected with COMINT or COMINT activities.

SECRET

2. Information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to national security or national interests, will be classified SECRET. Examples of the kind of information which may warrant this classification are:-

(a) Construction and budgetary matters pertaining to COMINT collection or processing organizations and installations, provided no reference is made to their specific functions.

(b) Base rights negotiations for COMINT sites, provided no mention is made of actual purposes for which the sites are intended.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could be prejudicial to national security or national interests, will be classified CONFIDENTIAL. Examples of the kind of information which may warrant this classification are:-

(a) Personnel reports and documents, civilian or military, which indicate authorized or actual COMINT agency strength in total, by organizational element, short title or symbol, by primary element, or by function.

(b) Regulations stating the general mission and functions of COMINT activities that do not reveal specific COMINT techniques or procedures.

(c) Correspondence on hazardous duty restrictions pertaining to individuals released from COMINT assignments.

UNCLASSIFIED

4. Examples of the kind of information which is UNCLASSIFIED are as follows:-

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(a) Cover names assigned to "Rapid Analytic Machinery" (RAM) when used out of context.

(b) The terms "Communications Intelligence" and "COMINT", "Signals Intelligence" and "SIGINT" when used out of context.

(c) References in broad, general, non-specific terms to intercept, direction finding, morse operator analysis and radio finger printing as sources of intelligence.

(d) Elementary principles of traffic analysis, military cryptanalysis and cryptography.

(e) Mention of interest in computer type circuits, if no indication is made to type of systems in which they are to be used.

(f) Individual job titles and descriptions that do not contain information otherwise listed above as requiring classification.

(g) Project numbers and titles used in justification of purchase of materials when no technical usage is specified.

(h) The fact of association between any U.S. or U.K. COMINT agency providing it is not shown to be in the COMINT field.

~~TOP SECRET DAUNT~~ 02143

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